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PROVIDING HEALTH CHECKS AS INCENTIVES TO RETAIN BLOOD DONORS - 
EVIDENCE FROM TWO FIELD EXPERIMENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
The collection of blood given by donors has proven to be a substantial societal and a 
managerial challenge. Consequently, blood donation services seek for incentive mechanisms to 
retain donors. However, economic or material rewards might entail negative side effects such 
as motivational crowding out or even attracting “bad blood”. In an effort to increase the reten-
tion of established blood donors, we conducted two randomized field trials (N1= 53,257, 
N2=31,522) in cooperation with the German Red Cross Blood Donation Service and tested the 
effectiveness of an incentive strategy that is directly related to the blood donation itself: offering 
a comprehensive blood health check. Contrary to previous related research, we found substan-
tial positive effects of a comprehensive blood health check incentive on donation behavior. In 
addition, unlike previous studies, we examine effects of repeated exposure to this incentive and 
do not find any wearout effects. Considering the positive effect of this incentive on donor re-
tention and the relative low cost for providing this service to donors, our findings suggest that 
offering comprehensive blood health check incentives is a viable and cost-efficient marketing 
strategy to increase the retention among previous donors even if offered over the longer run. 
 
Keywords: Blood donation, health incentives, service rewards, cholesterol tests, marketing 
strategies, field experiments, altruism, health care   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Human blood is in high demand. According to the American Cancer Society, in the U.S. 
alone more than 1.69 million people were expected to be diagnosed with cancer in 2017; many 
of which would need blood, sometimes daily, during their chemotherapy treatment (American 
Cancer Society, 2017). Other than cancer, various serious ailments such as cardiovascular dis-
ease or car accidents might necessitate multiple blood transfusions for a single individual 
(American Red Cross, 2016). It’s been estimated that the demand for blood rises up to 8 % 
annually in developed countries (Aravindakshan, Rubel, & Rutz, 2015). 
At the same time, in the U.S. only about 10% of the eligible population donates blood 
(American Red Cross, 2016). Such a shortage in blood supply is common in many Western 
countries. In fact, many observe a massive decline in blood donations. According to a report 
from NHS Blood and Transplant from 2016 there has been on average 30% fewer first-time 
donors in 21 developed countries within a decade (NHS Blood and Transplant, 2016). For Eng-
land and North Wales, the English NHS reports even 40% fewer new blood donors in 2014 
than in 2004 (NHS Blood and Transplant, 2015).  
Blood cannot be produced artificially – it can only be donated. Thus, the collection of a 
sufficient amount of blood is a significant societal problem making donor management a sub-
stantial challenge for nonprofit organizations worldwide (Ferguson, France, Abraham, Ditto, & 
Sheeran, 2007; Masser, Bednall, White, & Terry, 2012). As the acquisition of new donors is 
estimated to be more costly than retaining existing ones (Bennett, 2006, 2009; Masser et al., 
2012), and established donors donate on a regular basis, the latter group is highly valued by 
blood donation services (Wildman & Hollingsworth, 2009). Furthermore, the latter group has 
already passed the registration and medical process in the past and proved to be able to donate. 
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As a result, established donors are less likely to experience side effects (e.g., fainting) and re-
quire less service care than first-time donors. Consequently, blood donation services are partic-
ularly interested in incentive mechanisms to retain established donors. 
Marketing research has provided insights on a wide variety of incentive mechanisms for 
customer retention (e.g., Leenheer, van Heerde, Bijmolt, & Smidts, 2007; Meyners, Barrot, 
Becker, & Bodapati, 2017; Viswanathan, Sese, & Krafft, 2017) that have been applied to the 
blood donation context. For example, blood donation services frequently make use of economic 
incentives that include monetary or material rewards such as giveaways of minor monetary 
value (e.g., coffee mugs), lotteries, or paid time off work (Chmielewski et al., 2012) indicating 
positive effects on donors’ retention rates (Bruhin et al., 2015; Chmielewski et al., 2012; Glynn 
et al., 2006). However, economic or material rewards might entail negative side effects such as 
motivational crowding out (Andreoni, 1989; Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Lacetera & Macis, 
2010; Mellström & Johannesson, 2008; Titmuss, 1970) or even attracting “bad blood” (eco-
nomic incentives may tempt donors to be untruthful about their health status and prevent their 
voluntary self-exclusion from donations; Eastlund, 1998). Thus, marketing managers of non-
profit organizations are seeking for appropriate less risky strategies to retain blood donors. 
What is more, the World Health Organization (WHO, 2010) defined the objective to achieve 
100% voluntary and non-remunerated blood donations in every country of the world by 2020. 
In this study, we respond to the call for alternative incentives to increase donor retention 
and donation rates. In particular, we focused on an incentive that is directly related to the blood 
donation itself – offering a comprehensive blood health check incentive – and rewarding in 
particular established (as opposed to potential new, i.e. first -time) blood donors for their con-
tribution (Lacetera, Macis, & Stith, 2014; Sun, Lu, & Jin, 2016). This type of incentive might 
be attractive in several ways and is supporting WHO’s goal: First, blood donors compared to 
the average population are particularly health-conscious (e.g., they smoke less and are more 
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likely to be moderate drinkers and more physically active, Atsma, Veldhuizen, de Vegt, Dog-
gen, & de Kort, 2011; Shehu, Hofmann, Clement, & Langmaack, 2015) and therefore might be 
interested to get updates on their health condition. Second, providing a comprehensive blood 
health check might trigger reciprocal behavior leading to higher response rates (Goette et al., 
2009). Third, such an incentive is relatively cost-efficient for blood donation services because 
the donated blood is already being screened as part of the regular procedure. Finally, this type 
of incentive is non-remunerated. 
In blood donation research to date, only a few studies provide some initial insights with 
respect to a service incentive similar to ours: the effect of a cholesterol test incentive 
(Chmielewski et al., 2012; Glynn et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2009; Kessler et al., 2006; Rzasa & 
Gilcher, 1988). Interestingly, the evidence of its effect is mixed. While research based on survey 
studies and in-depth interviews report positive effects on blood donation intention (Glynn et 
al., 2003; Glynn et al., 2006; Kessler et al., 2006; Rzasa & Gilcher, 1988), a large field experi-
ment in Switzerland revealed no significant impact of cholesterol test offerings on individuals’ 
blood donation behavior (Goette et al., 2009). In particular, ambiguous outcomes between field 
and survey experiments in the context of socially desirable and thus biased topics such as blood 
donation reveal the importance of more evidence from randomized field trials with representa-
tive samples. 
We designed two large-scale field experiments (N1= 53,257, N2=31,522) that we ran in 
subsequent order in cooperation with the German Red Cross Blood Donation Service Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Hessen (GRC). These experiments provide three substantial contributions 
to the existing literature. First, rather than a “simple” cholesterol test, taking advantage of a 
growing health consciousness in the society (Bloch, 1984; Crawford, 1987, 2006) and the “ex-
plosion of the health care consumerism movement across the globe” (Dutta-Bergman, 2004), 
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we examined the effect of a comprehensive blood test (i.e., blood level test including choles-
terol, creatinine and uric acid) on blood donation behavior. More importantly, our incentive 
was framed and communicated as a “health check” to convey an awareness for the importance 
of health concerns. Our findings are contrary to the cholesterol test incentives-findings by 
Goette et al. (2009), as both of our field experiments showed that our comprehensive blood 
health check increased donation rates. 
Second, we studied not only immediate effects on donor response rates but also potential 
wearout effects of the comprehensive blood health check incentives (Experiment II). Our re-
sults indicate no wearout effects after repeated exposure. 
Third, our findings are especially interesting as we conducted our study in Germany 
where the type of the comprehensive blood test that we offered with our “health check” is free 
(biennially) to any individual 35 years or older when they go to a physician. Yet, even in that 
age group our blood health check incentive increased donors’ response rates.  
Overall, the results of our two large scale field experiments provide the clear managerial 
advice to use blood health checks as a reliable marketing instrument to recruit repeat blood 
donors for subsequent donations and coincidently enhance their retention. Such blood health 
checks are effective and cost efficient and, therefore, a useful tool in the pursuit of voluntary 
and non-remunerated donations worldwide. More important, our findings had direct managerial 
implications: The German Red Cross has started to implement our comprehensive blood health 
check incentive. Finally, our findings support the increasing focus of marketing scholars on 
health care marketing as a new research field (e.g., Cleeren, Geyskens, Verhoef, & Pennings, 
2016; Stremersch, 2008). 
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2. DONOR INCENTIVE STRATEGIES 
Similar to companies from the for-profit sector, blood donation services are looking for 
strategies to rewarding frequent blood donors for their efforts as the acquisition costs for new, 
first-time donors are multiple times higher than the retention costs for established donors (Ben-
nett, 2006, 2009; Masser et al., 2012). In addition, retention marketing in the blood donation 
sector targets established donors in order to stimulate further or more frequent donations 
(Capizzi & Ferguson, 2005). Diverse incentive schemes have been adapted from the for-profit 
sector to this non-profit area.  
Some organizations rely on economic and material rewards to increase the retention of their 
target group. Although economic and material rewards are common practice in the field of 
blood donation, previous research inside and outside of the blood donation domain found mixed 
evidence with respect to the performance of these rewards. Specifically, some results from the 
blood donation domain suggest to downplay the monetary value of economic rewards or using 
rewards in a less clear economic connotation (Lacetera, Macis, & Slonim, 2013). For example, 
Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (2014) compared the effectiveness of cash and $5, $10, and $15 
gift cards of equal monetary value and found gift cards to be more effective to increase blood 
donation rates. In fact, in a prior study, Lacetera and Macis (2010) found blood donors even 
declaring to stop donating if given 10 Euros in cash. This effect was absent when a voucher of 
the same nominal value was offered instead. In addition, findings outside of the blood donation 
domain have shown, for example, that financial incentives have the potential to invoke market-
pricing norms where the amount of compensation directly determines the level of effort (see 
Heyman & Ariely, 2004, but also Dur, Non, & Roelfsema, 2010 and Wang & Tong, 2015). In 
addition, cash incentives may attract potentially “undesired” individuals with “bad blood” 
(Eastlund, 1998) and may be demotivating (Ariely et al., 2009; Jin & Huang, 2014; Wang 
& Tong, 2015). Thus, managers of non-profit organizations should be aware that although cash 
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is typically highly desirable, there are various possible downsides to offering cash as an incen-
tive for blood donation. 
Alternatively, material incentives of minor financial value are common practice to increase 
donation rates. Chmielewski et al. (2012) for instance found no evidence for crowding-out giv-
ing branded tokens and paid time off work for blood donation. However, branded tokens were 
found to be costly for the blood donation service. Offering the opportunity to participating in a 
lottery e.g., for winning a long-distance journey is another often-used method to increase do-
nation rates. While authors were able to show promising effects on blood donation behavior in 
a study in Switzerland (Goette & Stutzer, 2008), in another survey study, tokens or awards of 
appreciation such as coffee mugs or lotteries were least likely to encourage the intention to 
return for blood donation (Glynn et al., 2003). 
Together, due to the mixed evidence of direct monetary incentives or material gifts on do-
nation behavior and the potential drawbacks, alternative marketing strategies are required. One 
such strategy is to provide a special service to important customers (e.g., access to airport 
lounges for premium customers; Palmeira et al., 2016). In the context of blood donation ser-
vices, offering a comprehensive blood test to a donor would be directly related to the service 
provided by the donor (donating blood). Thus, by offering a blood “health check” to established 
blood donors, we aim to provide this valuable donor group with such a functional service. This 
type of incentive might be attractive in several ways: (1) It have the potential to satisfy blood 
donors’ health-consciousness and therefore be highly appreciated by them (Atsma et al., 2011; 
Shehu et al., 2015), (2) donated blood is always screened as part of the regular procedure so 
that comprehensive blood health check incentives should be fairly cheap to offer, (3) with the 
implementation of blood health checks, blood donation services would meet WHO’s goal. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The goal of two randomized field experiments was to measure the effectiveness of providing 
an non-remunerated incentive to established donors to motivate them to attend the next availa-
ble blood drive. Specifically, we offered a comprehensive blood test presented as a “health 
check” to trigger the donors’ third donation within twelve months (52 weeks). In both experi-
ments, the incentive was announced through a coupon (=treatment) that was included in the 
invitation letter (sent via postal mail or email) that donors receive routinely for upcoming do-
nation drives. In both experiments, we randomly selected donation drives for our treatment and 
control groups. Thus, the randomization was done on the blood drive level. We relied on the 
planned future blood drives at the time of the respective field experiments (Experiment I 
N=380, Experiment II N=418 blood drives). Table 1 (descriptive statistics) in the results section 
shows that the randomization worked well with respect to age, gender, and donation history. 
We additionally performed t-test and chi-squared test procedures (see Table 2). Only few dif-
ferences were significant, marginally though, despite the large sample. Thus, together, based 
on the rather large number of blood drives and the few and marginal differences presented in 
Table 2, we consider the samples to be sufficiently randomized.  
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
Figure 1 illustrates the experimental process for both experiments (Experiment I and II) 
for the treatment and the control group. As can be seen, we measured the donors’ responses in 
terms of whether they showed up at a donation drive after either receiving a letter with a health 
check coupon (treatment group) or without (control group). Once at a blood drive, donors con-
tinued with the standard donation process except that for the experimental group the medical 
staff collected a small extra sample of blood during the donation. Afterwards, the extra blood 
sample got extensively tested in the laboratories of the GRC. Finally, the blood health check 
results including standard reference blood level results were sent within two weeks after the 
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blood drive via postal mail to the donors. In case of anomalous results, donors were informed 
by the GRC via postal mail together with the advice to contact their primary care physician for 
an in-depth physical check-up. 
Figure 1 about here 
In Experiment I we tested the overall effectiveness of the blood health check with respect 
to donor response behavior. Experiment II was effectively a replication of Experiment I to test 
for the effect of repeated exposure to our health check incentive and examined potential wearout 
effects. Additionally, we examined possible age effects in both Experiments (particularly, if the 
incentive was effective with the age group 35+ years old that is eligible for comprehensive 
blood tests for free (biennially) through their primary care physicians). 
3.1 Field Experiment I 
Experiment I (EXP I) was conducted in January 2015 by the GRC Baden-Wuerttemberg/Hes-
sen. We randomly selected 183 donation drives as our treatment group. Donors with their po-
tential third donation within the last 52 weeks received an invitation to the next available blood 
donation drive including a coupon for a health check. The coupon offered the opportunity for a 
comprehensive blood test including donors’ blood lipid levels (i.e. cholesterol), creatinine, and 
uric acid by bringing the coupon to the blood drive (donors, who received email invitations, 
received a downloadable coupon that they had to print out and bring with them to the blood 
drive).  
Another randomly selected 197 donation drives represented our control group sample 
within the same observation period. Here invitations were sent out without any coupon for 
blood health checks. These donors were invited via “standard” letters and emails to the next 
possible donation drive. Over both conditions, 53,257 invitations were sent out to donors. No 
other incentives (e.g., thank-you gifts or lotteries) were used within the experimental phase. 
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We defined our main dependent variable “response rate” as whether the established do-
nors attended one of the donation drives announced in the invitation letter/email. In Model 1, 
we controlled for covariates such as donors’ demographics: (i) gender (female = 1) and (ii) age 
in years, as well as donation history: (iii) number of previous donations, (iv) number of previous 
deferrals, and (v) whether the donor received invitations via email instead of postal mail.  
We further controlled for blood groups (Thomas, Feng, & Krishnan, 2015). We specif-
ically controlled for negative blood groups ((vi) Rh negative blood group (=1)) because only 
15% of the population fall in this category and that is why the GRC contacts these donors more 
often (i.e. they are reminded in shorter intervals of blood donation opportunities and perhaps 
feel a stronger obligation to donate blood; German Red Cross, 2017b).  
Finally, we considered for a particularity of the health care system in Germany: People 
35 years or older can receive similar comprehensive blood tests as this study’s health check 
incentive biennially at no charge from their primary health care physician. People’s health in-
surances cover their costs entirely. Consequently, attending the blood donation drive is not nec-
essary for this age group to get such a free test. Thus, our health check incentive may be poten-
tially more attractive for the younger age group below 35 years. To examine this, we divided 
our sample into two sub-groups ((vii) < 35 years; Model 2a and ≥ 35 years; Model 2b) and 
tested the effect of our health check incentive on both age groups separately. Figure 2 presents 
the experimental process in both (treatment and control) groups. 
3.2 Field Experiment II 
Experiment II (EXP II) was a replication test and, in addition, meant to test for potential wearout 
effects. The experiment took place in November 2015 at blood donation drives of the GRC 
Baden-Wuerttemberg. We randomly selected 213 donation drives for our treatment group (in-
vitation with blood health check coupon) and 205 donation drives for our control group (stand-
ard invitation without blood health check coupon). Out of 31,522 donors, 49% (N=15,292) 
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received the treatment invitation and 51% (N=16,230) the control invitation (see Figure 2). 
There were no other incentives (e.g., thank-you gifts or lotteries) during the experimental pe-
riod.  
Figure 2 about here 
 
The data comprised donors that were part of either Experiment II only (Model 2) or both 
Experiments I and II (Model 3). The latter group was divided into two subsamples: Donors that 
were in the treatment group in Experiment I (Model 3a) and donors that were in the control 
group in Experiment I (Model 3b). Figure 3 illustrates all estimated models in Experiments I 
and II. As can be seen, we tested the effect of the blood health check incentive in Experiment 
II on both subgroups and analyzed the impact separately to gain information about potential 
wearout effects. Consistent with Experiment I, we also analyzed subsamples of different age 
groups (< 35 years; Model 4a and ≥ 35 years; Model 4b).  
Figure 3 about here 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Figure 2 presents the descriptive response rate results in Experiment I and II by condition. As 
can be seen, in both experiments the donation response rates were higher for the treatment group 
that received the blood health check incentive. The relative increase compared to the control 
group was 16.9% in Experiment I, and 8.2% in Experiment II.  
We provide model-free evidence in Figures 4 and 5 across gender and age groups for both ex-
periments. In all groups, donors’ response rate was higher for the treatment group (donors, 
who were invited with a health check coupon) than for the control group (donors, who re-
ceived the standard invitation without a health check coupon).  
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Figure 4 & 5 about here 
 
4.1 Field Experiment I 
Descriptives: As can be seen in Table 1, 44.3% of all donors received the health check invitation 
(treatment group). 5.3% of the entire sample received the invitation via email (41.1% of those 
donors received the invitation including the blood health check coupon). The number of lifetime 
blood donations among participants before the experiment averaged 28.7. On average, the do-
nors had experienced 0.7 deferrals, 0.02 previously failed punctures, and 0.01 nullifications. 
About 41% of the donors were female. The average age was 45.8 years. More than 20.8% of 
donors had the blood group Rh negative. The randomization worked out well (Table 2). Espe-
cially the highly relevant variables that are related to previous behavior (e.g., number of previ-
ous donations) and to gender (men can donate blood more often per year than women) of blood 
donors are very well balanced. 
Analysis: We ran a logit model to estimate the response rate by treatment while controlling for 
age effects and other relevant covariates. 
!"#$%&#"' = 	* + ,-.' + /01"' + 23' + 4'  (1) 
RESPONSEi indicates whether the donor i attended a blood drive within the experimental phase 
after receiving the invitation letter. It is equal to 1 if donor i attended and 0 if not. 
The blood health check intervention is represented by HCi and is equal to 1 if donor i received 
the health check coupon and 0 if the donor did not receive it (control). AGEi represents a dummy 
variable for age groups with 18 – 25 years as the reference group. The remaining dummy vari-
ables (gender, Rh negative blood group, invitation via email, and the number of previous blood 
donations, deferrals, previously failed punctures and nullifications) are represented by Xi. For 
easier interpretation of the results we used the Odds Ratios (OR) of our coefficients. 
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Findings: Model 1 (general model). The overall results of the logistic regression (see Table 3) 
revealed significantly positive effects of the health check intervention on the response rate. The 
health check intervention increased the probability of attending a donation by 33% (OR 
β1=1.33, p <.000) compared to donors that received the standard invitation.  
The GRC sent invitations via postal mail or email. The effect of email versus postal mail 
(β2=1.01, p≥.1) was not significant. The number of previous blood donations had a marginally 
significant, positive effect: they increased the response rate by 2% (OR β3=1.02, p<.000). The 
influence of deferrals was significant and decreased the response rate by 5% (OR β4=.95, 
p<.000), failed punctures significantly reduced the response rate by 12% (OR β5=.88, p<.05), 
and nullifications significantly reduced it by 14% (OR β6=.86, p<.05). Female donors had a 
23% lower response rate than males (OR β7=.77, p<.000); a significant difference. The latter 
might be in part because females can only donate up to four times per year while males are 
allowed to donate up to six times per year (German Red Cross, 2017a). The probability of 
response increased with donor age: The difference among 18 – 25 (reference group) and 26 – 
35-year-old donors was not significant (β9=1.05, p≥.1). Compared to donors at the age of 18 – 
25 the response rate was 24% higher for donors at the age of 36 – 45 (OR β10=1.24, p<.000), 
23% for 46 – 55-year-old donors (OR β11=1.23, p<.000) and 28% for donors at the age of 56 – 
71 years (OR β12=1.28, p<.000). Individuals with Rh negative blood groups did not respond 
more frequently (β13=.97, p≥.1). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Model 2 (age effects). Individuals 35 years and older can receive free blood health checks 
biennially from their primary care physicians. Thus, we expected lower response rates-effects 
of our intervention for this older age group. Interestingly, however, we found a positive impact 
of our health check intervention on both age groups (age < 35 years OR β1=1.32, p<.000 and 
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age ≥ 35 years OR β1=1.33, p<.000). This is in line with our observation in the general Model 
1 that response rates significantly increased by age (Model 1; also, for means of response rates: 
Donors at the age of 34 and below responded at a level of 31.5% whereas older donors re-
sponded at a level of 44.2%). That is, while the health check incentive was a successful inter-
vention to attract younger blood donors, it was equally effective among older donors.  
4.2 Field Experiment II 
Descriptives: As can be seen in Table 1, 48.5% of all donors received the blood health check 
intervention (treatment group). 8.9% of the entire sample received their invitation via email 
(51.2% of those donors received the invitation including a health check coupon). Donors on 
average had 28.1 blood donations in the past, 0.5 deferrals, 0.01 previously failed punctures, 
0.2 deferrals because of low hemoglobin, and 0.02 nullifications. The share of female donors 
was 40.8%, the average age was 45.3 years, and 20.8% had a Rh negative blood group. This 
sample included 24.6% donors that already participated in Experiment I. 
Analysis: Same as in Experiment I, we ran a logit model to estimate the donation response rates 
as a function of blood health check intervention while controlling for age effects and other 
relevant covariates assuming equation (1). In addition, in order to test for wearout effects due 
to repeat exposure to our health check incentives, in our general model (Model 1, Table 4) we 
also controlled for whether participants had already participated in Experiment I (no matter if 
they were part of the treatment or control group in Experiment I). 
Table 4 about here 
To analyze the effect of first exposure (novelty) to the blood health check intervention, 
in Model 2 we focused on donors who had not participated in Experiment I. To test for wearout 
effects in Model 3a we focused on donors that were previously (in Experiment I) invited with 
the blood health check coupon and in Model 3b on donor that had previously received the 
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standard (control) invitation (i.e. without health check coupon). In addition, we analyzed age 
effects for both age groups: < 35 years (Model 4a) and ≥ 35 years (Model 4b). 
Findings: Model 1 (general model). Same as in Experiment I, we found a significantly positive 
effect of the blood health check incentive on response rates: they increased by 13% in compar-
ison to the control group (OR γ1=1.13, p<.000). Note that the lower relative increase in response 
rates in Experiment II in comparison to Experiment I might have been due to the fact that only 
donors from Baden-Wuerttemberg were part of Experiment II; Baden-Wuerttemberg has a 
higher degree of urbanization, and urban areas typically have lower donation rates compared to 
rural areas (Bekkers and Veldhuizen (2008); Greinacher, Fendrich, and Hoffmann (2010)). In 
addition, there might have been seasonal effects at play as Experiment I was conducted in Jan-
uary, while Experiment II was conducted in November were donation rates are typically lower 
(we analyzed the average donation rates across 12 months in 2014 from GRC data in the same 
regions and found that the donation rate in November 2014 was 14% lower than in January 
2014). 
The other covariates’ effects were equally similar to what we had observed in Experi-
ment I. In particular, there was no significant impact of whether the donor received the invita-
tion via postal mail or email (γ2=1.01, p≥.1). Further, the previous donation history influenced 
the response rate positively but by only 1% (OR γ3=1.01, p<.000). Previous deferrals had a 
minor negative impact of 4% (OR γ4=.96, p<.000). There was no significant influence of the 
other deferral types (γ5 – γ7). Females’ response rate was 21% lower than the response rate of 
male donors (OR γ8=.79, p<.000). Older individuals revealed higher response rates: The differ-
ence among 18 – 25 (reference group) and 26 – 35-year-old donors was not significant 
(γ10=1.05, p≥.1). Compared to the age group of 18 – 25 years older donors (reference group) 
donors at the age of 36 – 45 responded with a rate of 22% (OR γ11=1.22, p<.000), 46 – 55-year-
old donors responded with a rate of 28% (OR γ12=1.28, p<.000), and 56 – 71-year-old donors 
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responded with a rate of 38% (OR γ13=1.38, p<.000). The Rh factor of the blood had no signif-
icant impact on response rates (γ14).  
Model 2 (Experiment II participants only). As can be seen, we replicated our findings from 
Experiment I: The health check intervention significantly increased the response rate by 8% 
(OR γ1=1.08, p<.000). The effects of the covariates in Model 2 were similar to our general 
Model 1 for Experiment I. 
Model 3 (Experiment I treatment group versus Experiment I control group). In Model 3, 
we focused on donors who had previously participated in Experiment I to test for potential 
wearout and longer-term effects. We separately analyzed the subsample of donors who were in 
the treatment group (Model 3a) and control group (Model 3b) in Experiment I respectively. In 
Model 3a we found that exposing donors to the blood health check incentive for a second time 
within 10 months significantly increased the response rate by 41% (OR γ1=1.41, p<.000). In 
Model 3b, donors received a standard invitation in Experiment I and thus, were exposed to the 
health check incentive only for the first time in Experiment II. Here we found that the first-time 
exposure significantly increased the response rate by 25% (OR γ1=1.25, p<.000). Consequently, 
our data confirms that repeated exposure reinforced the positive impact of the blood health 
check incentive (+16%) instead of resulting in a wearout effect. 
Model 4 (age effects). In Model 4a, we analyzed the effect of the blood health check incentive 
on donors younger than 35 years (who do not get free comprehensive blood tests through their 
primary care physicians); in Model 4b, we focused on donors 35 years and older (who bienni-
ally get those free comprehensive blood tests). Same as in Experiment I, we found a positive 
effect of our blood health check incentive for both age groups (age < 35 years OR γ1=1.15, 
p<.000 and age ≥ 35 years OR γ1=1.12, p<.000).  
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5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The blood donation of an average adult at a blood drive can save up to three lives (American 
Red Cross, 2016). However, blood donation services worldwide are facing the challenge of 
providing blood banks and hospitals with a stable supply of blood. For this purpose, volunteers 
are needed to donate their blood on a regular basis.  
Established marketing strategies (such as economic or material rewards) to incentivize 
blood donors and to enhance their retention to the blood service might entail negative effects 
such as crowding out or attracting “bad blood” while additionally not meeting the WHO’s goal 
of non-remuneration. In an effort to leverage these problems, alternative marketing strategies 
are required. In two randomized controlled field trials (RCTs), we tested the effectiveness of a 
service-based marketing intervention that takes advantage of the growing health consciousness 
in society while being relatively cheap/costless for blood donation services: offering a compre-
hensive blood test to retain established blood donors. In particular, in both of our experiments, 
donors received an invitation to an upcoming blood drive either with or without a coupon for a 
free blood “health check” to be performed at the donation site. Unlike to a previous experiment 
by Goette et al. (2009), we offered a much more comprehensive examination of donors’ blood, 
labeling it as a health check (rather than offering a simple cholesterol test). In addition, we 
tested for a second exposure to the same incentive within a 10-months period to test for potential 
wearout effects. Contrary to the field trial in Switzerland, where the cholesterol test-incentive 
did not have a significant effect on donor response rates (Goette et al., 2009), we found signif-
icantly positive effects of the comprehensive blood health check incentive on donor response 
rates in both of our Experiments. Specifically, donors who received invites with our health 
check incentive were 33% (EXP I) and 13% (EXP II) more likely to attend a third donation 
within 12 months compared to donors invited without the incentive. 
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In addition, our Experiment II findings provide evidence that the effect of the compre-
hensive blood health check intervention remains positive even after two exposures, albeit 
weaker compared to the first-time exposure. Thus, the repeated exposure to our blood health 
check incentive further strengthened the effect on donors’ response rates. These findings sug-
gest that established donors might be interested in regular updates on their health status. 
In Germany, where we ran our RCTs, individuals ages 35 years or above can get com-
prehensive blood level tests biennially through their primary care physician free of charge. We 
therefore analyzed whether our intervention was more attractive to the younger age group be-
low 35 years. However, in both experiments we found a significant positive impact of our blood 
health check intervention on donors’ response rates irrespective of age. Thus, offering a blood 
health check incentive can be a successful marketing instrument to attract and retain established 
blood donors of all age groups.  
More generally, we tested the effectiveness of an incentive scheme that was meant to 
avoid a crowding out of donors’ number one reason to give blood: their intrinsic motivation to 
help others (see American Red Cross, 2016). Previous research has discussed in detail when 
and why extrinsic incentives are likely to avoid crowding out effects (see Gneezy, Meier, & 
Rey-Biel, 2011) and have shown that their design (e.g., value/cost of the stakes) and the form 
in which they are given (in particular remunerated or non-remunerated) matter in terms of how 
they interact with intrinsic motivations. The key is to not change the nature of the behavior from 
a social to a business frame or transaction (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b; Heyman & Ar-
iely, 2004), which we tried to avoid by offering a non-monetary reward that is directly related 
to the expertise of blood donation services and relatively costless (as to not take away from the 
main goal of helping others). In addition, some evidence from education suggests that it is ben-
eficial to have incentives be well-specified and targeted as in our case (e.g., “give blood at the 
next drive” rather than “give blood”). As long as these general guiding principles are followed, 
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there should be various possible incentive designs other than the one that we tested to effec-
tively increase donations without driving crowding out effects (e.g., use of prosocial incentive 
schemes; see Imas, 2014). 
Based on our findings and the limitations of our study, we suggest three avenues for 
further research. First, we tested a two-time exposure to the blood health check incentive within 
a 10-months period. As such, we cannot rule out longer-term wearout effects. Therefore, future 
research may want to examine more exposures and their effects over a longer period of time.  
Second, our study was conducted in Germany. Although we replicate the findings from 
Experiment I in Experiment II, further studies in different countries may be useful to learn about 
the generalizability of our findings.  
Third, blood donation services highly value established blood donors because the ac-
quisition of new donors is estimated to be more costly (in terms of money and time; Bennett, 
2006, 2009; Masser et al., 2012; Wildman & Hollingsworth, 2009). Consequently, we focused 
our study on the former group. An important practical question that arises from our focus is to 
what extent do our findings extend to non-donors (i.e. potential new, first-time donors). Previ-
ous research suggests that the reasons for donating are substantially different across the two 
groups and has identified various determinants of initial donation, the most prominent of which 
are (in comparison to repeat donors): donation anxiety (i.e. fear of needles or pain (Masser, 
White, Hyde, Terry, & Robinson, 2009; Robinson, Masser, White, Hyde, & Terry, 2008) and 
more external influences or rational as opposed to internal and affective factors such as social 
norms/pressure, time demands, or perceived rewards for donating (see Godin et al., 2005; Reid 
& Wood, 2008; Lemmens et al., 2005; Piliavin & Callero, 1991; Reid & Wood, 2008). Of these 
determinants, we would expect our comprehensive blood health check to primarily address ra-
tional consideration – to the extent that non-donors value health. However, established blood 
donors have been found to be relatively more health-conscious than the average population (e.g. 
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Atsma et al., 2011; Shehu et al., 2015). Thus, depending on the importance weights of the var-
ious determinants, we hypothesize that our comprehensive blood health check incentive would 
be relatively less (or even non-) effective for non-donors than for established donors; particu-
larly among the group of 35+ year-olds, who can biennially get comprehensive blood health 
checks for free from their primary care physicians (unless the time-efficiency of the compre-
hensive blood test is significantly superior at a blood drive than at a primary care physician’s 
office). Given the motivational differences and the fact that we can only speculate, future re-
search may want to systematically examine the generalizability of our findings across non-
donor and donor groups.  
6. CONCLUSION 
The results from two large-scale RCTs find significant and substantial positive effects of a 
comprehensive blood test marketed as “health check” on the response rates of the most valuable 
donor group: established blood donors. This service incentive is in line with WHO’s goal to 
avoid remunerated incentives. In addition, it is an incentive that is relatively costless for blood 
services because every potential donor’s blood has to be analyzed anyways -- the additional 
cost of offering a more extensive test is estimated at about EUR 1 only; largely, for administra-
tion and communicating of the results. Due to its benefits, our blood health check incentive has 
been adopted and is currently being rolled out in different regional blood donation services of 
the GRC.  
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FIGURE 2: RESPONSE RATES IN EXPERIMENTS I AND II BY CONDITION 
EXPERIMENT I 
January 2015 in Baden-Wuerttemberg & Hessen 
N=53,257 
Ø response rate: 41.3% 
 
EXPERIMENT II 
November 2015 in Baden-Wuerttemberg 
N=31,522 
Ø response rate: 39.3% 
   
Control Group I 
Standard invitation 
N= 29,677 
Ø response rate: 38.4% 
Treatment Group I 
Invitation with HC 
N= 23,580 
Ø response rate: 44.9% 
 
Control Group II 
Standard invitation 
N=16,230 
Ø response rate: 37.8% 
Treatment Group II 
Invitation with HC 
N=15,292 
Ø response rate: 40.9% 
 
        
 
 
 
  
HC = Health Check 
Δabsolute = 6.5 % 
Δrelative = 16.9 % 
Δabsolute = 3.1 % 
Δrelative = 8.2 % 
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FIGURE 3: ESTIMATED MODELS IN EXPERIMENTS I & II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TG = treatment group, CG = control group, EXP = experiment 
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FIGURE 4: MODEL FREE EVIDENCE – RESPONSE ACROSS GENDER GROUPS IN EXPERIMENTS I & II 
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FIGURE 5: MODEL FREE EVIDENCE – RESPONSE ACROSS AGE GROUPS IN EXPERIMENTS I & II 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF EXPERIMENTS I AND II 
  EXPERIMENT I 
 
EXPERIMENT II 
  TG & CG 
 
TG 
 
CG TG & CG 
 
TG 
 
CG 
  Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
α1 Response (donor showed up to donation drive)a 41.3%  0 1 44.9%  0 1 38.4%  0 1 39.3%  0 1 40.9%  0 1 37.8%  0 1 
α2 Health check intervention (treatment group)a 44.3%  0 1         48.5%  0 1         
α3 Emaila 5.3%  0 1 4.9%  0 1 5.6%  0 1 8.9%  0 1 9.4%  0 1 8.5%  0 1 
α4 Number previous donations 28.7  . 23.6 2 154 28.6  . 23.4 2 154 28.8  . 23.7 2 147 28.1  . 23.4 1 157 28.3  . 23.3 1 157 27.9  . 23.5 1 155 
α5 Number previous deferrals .7  . 1.0 0 14 .7  . 1.0 0 13 .7  . 1.0 0 14 .5  . .8 0 12 .6  . .8 0 12 .5  . .8   0 10 
α6 Number previously failed punctures .0  . .2 0 5 .0  . .2 0 4 .0  . .2 0 5 .0  . .1 0 4 .0  . .1 0 4 .0  . .1   0 4 
α7 Number previous hemoglobin deferralsb             .2  . .7 0 19 .2  . .7 0 19 .2  . .7   0 14 
α8 Number previous nullifications .0  . .1 0 3 .0  . .1 0 2 .0  . .1 0 3 .0  . .1 0 2 .0  . .1 0 2 .0  . .1   0 2 
α9 Gender (female) a 41.0%  0 1 41.2%  0 1 40.9%  0 1 40.8%  0 1 40.6%.  0 1 41.0%  0 1 
α10 Age group 18-25a 11.6%  0 1 11.1%  0 1 11.9%  0 1 13.1%  0 1 12.7%  0 1 13.4%  0 1 
α11 Age group 26-35a 12.8%  0 1 12.3%  0 1 13.1%  0 1 13.6%  0 1 13.0%  0 1 14.1%  0 1 
α12 Age group 36-45a 18.0%  0 1 18.1%  0 1 17.9%  0 1 16.1%  0 1 16.3%  0 1 16.0%  0 1 
α13 Age group 46-55a 31.4%  0 1 32.2%  0 1 30.8%  0 1 31.4%  0 1 32.0%  0 1 30.9%  0 1 
α14 Age group 56-71a 26.2%  0 1 26.3%  0 1 26.2%  0 1 25.8%  0 1 26.1%  0 1 25.5%  0 1 
α15 Rh negative blood groupa 20.8%  0 1 20.6%  0 1 21.1%  0 1 20.8%  0 1 20.5%  0 1 21.0%  0 1 
α16 Participants of EXP Iab             24.6%  0 1 24.5%  0 1 24.8%  0 1 
 N 53,257. 23,580 29,677 31,522  15,292 16,230 
 EXP = experiment, TG = treatment group, CG = control group, adummy variable (0/1), binformation available for EXP II only 
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TABLE 2 –RANDOMIZATION CHECKS: T-TEST AND CHI-SQUARE TEST RESULTS 
  EXPERIMENT I  EXPERIMENT II 
  TG  CG  t-test Chi2  TG  EG  t-test Chi2 
 
 
Mean 
 
Mean Diff p P  Mean  Mean Diff p P 
Emaila 4.9% 5.6% .68%   .000 *** 
 
9.4% 
 
8.5% -.96%   .003 *** 
Number previous donations 28.6  . 28.8  . .179 .383   28.3  . 27.9  . -.373 .158   
Number previous deferrals .7  . .7  . -.025 .004 ***  .6  . .5  . -.014 .126   
Number previously failed punctures .0  . .0  . -.001 .689   .0  . .0  . .001 .575   
Number previous hemoglobin deferralsb       .2  . .2  . .001 .911   
Number previous nullifications .0  . .0  . .001 .220   .0  . .0  . .001 .567   
Gender (female) a 41.2% 4.9% -.25%   .564 4.6%. 41.0% .38%   .495 
Age group 18-25a 11.1% 11.9% .86%   .002 *** 12.7% 13.4% .76%   .046 *** 
Age group 26-35a 12.3% 13.1% .86%   .003 *** 13.0% 14.1% 1.06%   .006 *** 
Age group 36-45a 18.1% 17.9% -.22%   .506 16.3% 16.0% -.22%   .588 
Age group 46-55a 32.2% 3.8% -1.45%   .000 *** 32.0% 3.9% -1.04%   .047 ** 
Age group 56-71a 26.3% 26.2% -.04%   .912 26.1% 25.5% -.56%   .258 
Rh negative blood groupa 2.6% 21.1% .51%   .149 2.5% 21.0% .51%   .265 
Participants of EXP Iab     
   24.5% 24.8% .29%   .556 
adummy variable (0/1), binformation available for EXP II only, TG = treatment group (HC intervention), CG = control group (without HC intervention), ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.10, t-test = Student's t-test; Chi2 = Chi-
squared distribution 
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TABLE 3 – RESULTS OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION IN EXPERIMENT I  
RESPONSE RATES DEPENDING ON HEALTH CHECK INTERVENTION (ODDS RATIOS) 
 Dependent variable: Response 
(donor showed up to donation drive)a 
Model 1 
general model 
Model 2a 
age < 35 
Model 2b 
age ≥ 35 
 age effects 
 Mean of response for subsamples 41.3% 31.5% 44.2% 
  OR SE OR SE OR SE 
β1 HC intervention (treatment group)a 1.33*** .02  1.32*** .05  1.33*** .03 
β2 Emaila 1.01 .04  .82** .08  1.04 .05 
β3 Number previous donations 1.02*** .00  1.04*** .00  1.01*** .00 
β4 Number previous deferrals .95*** .01  .90*** .02  .95*** .01 
β5 Number previously failed punctures .88** .05  .76 .15  .90* .06 
β6 Number previous nullifications .86** .06  .74 .14  .87* .07 
β7 Gender (female = 1)a .77*** .01  .66*** .03  .82*** .02 
β8 Age group 18-25a Reference Group 
β9 Age group 26-35a 1.05 .04     
β10 Age group 36-45a 1.24*** .04     
β11 Age group 46-55a 1.23*** .04     
β12 Age group 56-71a 1.28*** .05     
β13 Rh negative blood groupa .97 .02  1.00 .05  .96* .02 
β14 Constant .39*** .01  .34*** .01  .48*** .01 
 N 53,257 12,288 40,969 
 Pseudo R2 .036 .035 .028 
 adummy variable (0/1), ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.10, coefficients indicated by Odds Ratios (OR), SE = Standard Error 
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TABLE 4 – RESULTS OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION IN EXPERIMENT II 
RESPONSE RATES DEPENDING ON HEALTH CHECK INTERVENTION (ODDS RATIOS) 
 Dependent variable: Response (donor showed up to donation drive)a 
Model 1 
general 
model 
Model 2 
only EXP II 
participants 
Model 3a 
EXP I TG 
Model 3b 
EXP I CG 
Model 4a 
age < 35 
Model 4b 
age ≥ 35 
wearout effects age effects 
 Mean of response for subsamples 39.3% 39.0% 41.1% 39.8% 29.9% 42.5% 
  OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE 
γ1 HC intervention (treatment group)a  1.13*** .03  1.08*** .03  1.41*** .11  1.25*** .08  1.15*** .06  1.12*** .03 
γ2 Emaila  1.01 .04  1.04 .05  .90 .12  .99 .11  1.06 .09  .99 .05 
γ3 Number previous donations  1.01*** .00  1.01*** .00  1.01*** .00  1.01*** .00  1.03*** .00  1.01*** .00 
γ4 Number previous deferrals  .96*** .01  .96** .02  .97 .04  .95 .03  .91** .04  .96** .01 
γ5 Number previously failed punctures  .89 .10  .98 .12  .37** .16  .90 .27  .93 .24  .88 .10 
γ6 Number previous hemoglobin deferralsb  .99 .02  1.00 .02  .99 .06  .95 .04  .95 .06  .99 .02 
γ7 Number previous nullifications  .91 .08  .83* .09  .84 .28  1.30 .26  .92 .20  .90 .09 
γ8 Gender (female)a  .79*** .02  .81*** .02  .67*** .06  .78*** .05  .68*** .04  .84*** .02 
γ9 Age group 18-25a Reference Group 
γ10 Age group 26-35a  1.05 .05  1.05 .06  1.10 .19  .95 .13     
γ11 Age group 36-45a  1.22*** .06  1.25*** .07  1.20 .20  1.05 .14     
γ12 Age group 46-55a  1.28*** .06  1.32*** .06  1.20 .18  1.07 .13     
γ13 Age group 56-71a  1.38*** .06  1.40*** .07  1.39** .22  1.17 .15     
γ14 Rh negative blood groupa  .96 .03  .95 .03  1.01 .09  1.01 .07  .94 .06  .97 .03 
γ15 Constant  .39*** .02  .39*** .02  .39*** .06  .41*** .05  .37*** .02  .50*** .02 
 N 31,522  23,760  3,118  4,644  8,023  23,499  
 Pseudo R2 .029  .029  .033  .029  .022  .020  
 
adummy variable (0/1), binformation available for EXP II only, TG = treatment group (HC intervention), CG = control group (without HC intervention),  
***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.10, coefficients indicated by Odds Ratios (OR), SE = Standard Error 
 
